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Abstract. Designing evolutionary systems to meet stakeholder expectations on safety, reliability and 
overall resilience is of great importance in an age of interconnectivity and high dependency systems. 
With incidents and disruptions becoming more frequent in recent years, the requirement for systems 
to demonstrate high levels of resilience given the economic, political and temporal dimensions of 
complexity, resilience is of great significance today. Systemic resilience is of high importance at the 
global level. Therefore, the role of the system engineer and architect is becoming more demanding 
due to the need to consider requirements from a broader range of stakeholders and to implement them 
into early conceptual designs. The early modeling process of all systems is common ground for most 
engineering projects, creating an architecture to both understand a system and to design future 
iterations by applying model-based processes has become the norm. With the concept of systems-of-
systems (SoS) becoming common language across multiple engineering domains, model-based 
systems engineering techniques are evolving hand-in-hand to provide a paradigm to better analyse 
current and future SoS. The intrinsic characteristics of the constituent systems that make up the SoS 
make the challenge of designing and maintaining the reliability and resilience of a systems extremely 
difficult. This paper proposes a novel viewpoint, within an architecture framework (based around 
DoDAF, MoDAF and UPDM) to aid systems architects explore and design resilient SoS. This is 
known as the  Resilience Viewpoint. Much of the research in the area is focussed on critical 
infrastructure (CI), looking at telecommunication networks, electric grid, supply networks etc, and 
little has been done on a generalizable tool for SoS architecture analysis, especially using existing 
modeling languages. Here, the application of the ‘Resilience Viewpoint’ is demonstrated using a case 
study from an integrated water supply system of systems, to portray its potential analytical 
capabilities.  
Introduction 
Resilience engineering (Christopher P. Nemeth, 2014; Hollnagel, Paries, Woods, & Wreathall, 2011; 
Madni & Jackson, 2009) and the role of extending risk management strategies into projects have 
introduced some stimulating changes to the discipline of systems engineering (Stillitto, 2015). While 
systems engineering has always included processes to analyse risk in engineered projects, the notion 
of resilience has added new dimensions in the challenges of engineering reliable and resilient systems 
and services. Despite the lack of a common definition for the term resilience in the general sense, 
there is consensus that it is broadly related to the properties which are defined in the Oxford 
Dictionary of English as an object and its “ability to recoil or spring back into shape after bending, 
stretching, or being compressed”(Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010). Due to the lack of a resilience 
definition with regards to SoS, there have been a range of frameworks adopted to assess the resilience 
from both qualitative and quantitative approaches (Erol & Sauser, 2009; Filippini & Silva, 2014; 
Rahimi & Madni, 2014). However no standardized approach exists, thus, a void remains to analyse 
systems of most classifications because of the immaturity of tools which lack their own adaptability, 
  
 
flexibility and utility (Rahimi & Madni, 2014). For the purpose of this paper, a definition has been 
provided for resilience in the context of SoS: 
“The overall dynamic ability of the SoS to adapt in times of change and disruption at both the SoS 
and constituent system level, and to continue to provide operational functionality at a desired level 
of functionality.” 
As an evolving engineering topic (Hosseini, Barker, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2016; Uday & Marais, 
2014), resilience engineering is relatively unique and moderately young with regards to more 
established engineering disciplines. The theme of engineering resilience is particularly important in 
the context of systems-of-systems (SoS), a classification of system that has become the norm in 
today’s interconnected world. Systems of this nature include; air transport systems (ATS), emergency 
response systems, cyber-security systems, military systems, water resource management and 
distribution, and so on. These super-systems see a collection of previously perceived; ‘independent 
systems’ collaborating at a higher-level and exhibit operational capabilities and emergent behaviours 
(Karcanias and Hessami, 2011) that cannot be exhibited from the individual systems i.e. emergence 
(A. G. Hessami, 2011; A. Hessami & Karcanias, 2010) . The innate operational, managerial 
independence, evolutionary development and geographic distribution characteristics associated with 
the constituent systems, presents difficult challenges for sustaining a reliable and resilient SoS. 
Developing analytical tools to support the analysis of SoS is not easy, especially since SoS do not 
follow the conventional definition of systems and pose great challenges which are discussed at length 
in this paper. Technical support for systems engineers to analyse SoS should provide a systematic 
view of the overall SoS and its constituent systems (CS), mapping out stakeholders and CS, and 
outlining operational aspects and functional aspects of all constituent elements. A magnitude of 
dependencies exists between the aggregation of components within a SoS, and it is within these 
interrelationships at the operational level, that the features of resilience, reside. The proposed 
resilience viewpoint will provide the systems engineer or architect with a set of additional benefits 
beyond what the current modeling tools offer [(Mohammad, Kaminskiy, & Krivtsov, 2010)] which 
are specific to a given domain. Whereas the resilience viewpoint and the additional architecture 
viewpoints will give a holistic view of the SoS and a set of models/views that give a definitive focus 
on the resilience aspects of SoS design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram in Figure 1 shows that the SoS must be modelled in terms of the functional and non-
functional (‘ilities’) properties, which ultimately provide the resilience features in the SoS. Having a 
SoS architecture with a series of models allows the engineer or architect to express the SoS and its 
Figure 1. Evolving an SoS through MBSE processes 
  
 
CS from a range of perspectives through a range of architectural viewpoints within an architecture 
framework (Hause, 2010a; Hayden & Jeffries, 2012; Urbaczewski & Mrdalj, 2006). These static, 
architectural representations go a long way in the conceptual phases of design, allowing effective 
communication with stakeholders who have an influence on shaping the CS and the requirements 
definition process for future phases of the SoS evolution. Furthermore, as the diagram suggests, some 
form of dynamic modeling and simulation is required to test the performance metrics of conceptual 
models and the functional requirements of the CS. The resilience of a system will be measured in 
terms of meeting those performance requirements and demonstrating certain ilities (Table 1) that will 
allow the SoS to cope in times of disruption and irregular events.  
Systems of systems and Resilience 
Typically, a SoS (Maier, 1996) will incrementally evolve over several years or decades (Figure 2), to 
provide increased capability through the integration, addition, substitution, or removal of its CS. 
Unfortunately, traditional systems engineering methods, process and tools (Friedenthal, Moore, & 
Steiner, 2014; Ibarra-zannatha et al., 1994) do not accommodate the design and development of the 
aforementioned actions in the design of SoS evolutions with regards to its CS. The lack of an overall 
SoS ‘manager’ insinuates additional complexities in SoS design, especially with regards to resilience 
as the introduction of emergent behaviours are prone as new interactions transpire. It is not suggested 
that an SoS manager is feasible, however the role of such stakeholder would align CS goals and 
influence decisions to achieve the overall SoS goals. This role could be led by a CS within the SoS 
or a government organisation, depending of the SoS type. Challenges posed by the SoS with regards 
to the overall resilience are investigated in this paper and work on a novel resilience viewpoint within 
an existing architecture framework (the Department of Defense Architecture Framework, DoDAF 
(Hause, 2010a)) for engineering resilience in SoS is proposed. This process is part of a larger 
framework that includes several integrated processes to provide insights into architecture exploration 
for SoS design and evolution. Specifically, designing resilience in SoS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The concept of resilience has generated great momentum in the realm of engineering resilience in 
complex systems and SoS (Bergström, Winsen, & Henriqson, 2015; Bernice Lee, Felix Preston, & 
Gemma Green, 2012; Labaka, Hernantes, & Sarriegi, 2015), and surpasses the discussions of 
traditional engineering methods for reliability, robustness, security, risk management, and so forth. 
The proposed resilience viewpoint will add value and insight for systems engineers, architects and 
other practitioners who are analysing large mega-systems like SoS. As part of the reference 
architecture, the viewpoint is thought to add value in evaluating the structural resilience of the SoS 
topology focussing on a collection of systems with respects to vulnerability and criticality to an 
Figure 2. The Evolving SoS 
  
 
anticipated disturbance. Furthermore, the viewpoint allows for the non-functional properties (the 
‘ilities’ (McManus, Richards, Ross, & Hastings, 2007)) to be explored and assigned to parts of the 
architecture that deliver functionality.  
Table 1: Definition of Ilities 
‘Ility’ Definition 
Adaptability The ability of a system to change or be changed and to adjust readily to different 
conditions 
Evolvability The ability of a CS or SoS design to be changed over time to generate new 
capabilities 
Robustness The ability of a SoS or CS to maintain specific parameters in the context of 
changing system internal and external forces 
Flexibility The ability of a system to change when presented with external forces 
Changeability The ability of a CS to change its form at an acceptable level of resource 
expenditure and thus its function to continue operating 
Reparability The ability of a system to ‘fix’ itself after an incident of disruption 
Scalability The ability of a CS to change the current set of definite system parameters 
Versatility The ability to satisfy diverse requirements without changing current form 
Availability The ability of a system to be utilised for a specific capability or performance 
requirement 
Resilience should be considered at the architectural design phase of development, implying there 
must be some trade-off between increasing levels of resilience and cost of implementation. This paper 
proposes a guide similar to the levels of automation taxonomy proposed by Sheridan and Verplank 
(Hou, Banbury, & Burns, 2014), a similar idea can be construed for increasing levels of resilience in 
SoS. Figure 3 outlines this idea and demonstrates zero to five levels of resilience. Level zero implies 
no resilience present and five being “fully” resilient. There is an evident relationship between levels 
of resilience and likelihood of failure (Ash & Newth, 2007). High resilience insinuates low levels of 
vulnerability and vice versa for low levels of resilience. Resilience, of course, comes at a monetary 
cost. Higher levels of resilience are costlier as fail-safe mechanisms are built into the systems, and 
redundancy measures are heavily implemented to mitigate against freak incidents or unforeseen 
circumstances. It is difficult to allocate a quantitative value i.e. cost, to each level of resilience at this 
stage, as it will be relative to the context of the SoS the CS under analysis in a given scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. SoS Levels of Resilience 
  
 
A simple example of this would be to consider the delivery of fresh water to a demand centre in a 
region of frequent earthquakes. In order to reduce the likelihood water being cut off to that demand 
point due to a pipe burst, additional pipelines could be installed as backup water delivery mechanisms. 
This will obviously cost more money; however, the dire consequences of water shortage are more 
like to be averted. Figures 4 and 5 show a network of demand centres supplied with water from a 
service reservoir where water is supplied to the water grid and delivered via mains supply pipes to 
demand centres. Figure 4 shows one mains pipeline, whereas Figure 5 shows dual supply. Figure 5 
clearly shows an increased level of resilience as the demand centres become less vulnerable to a water 
cut-off and sustained availability of water is likely in the incident of one of the mains pipes breaking. 
Although this is a simple example, it shows the architectural implications of resilience in a clear way. 
The non-functional properties that have been addressed in this specific examples are availability, 
flexibility, robustness and if the water regulators choose to switch between the two delivery pipes in 
times of operation, it gives them a degree of adaptability (Nelson, Adger, & Brown, 2007), also.    
Systems of Systems and Reference Architecture 
The reference architecture of a SoS portrays the existing, current SoS architecture of the operational 
system. Figure 6 illustrates a design space exploration process for a generic SoS with a range of 
internal and external forces pushing for a changing set of requirements of the system; meaning 
updates to the SoS are needed. Some examples of external forces on our case study of the water 
supply system in the UK include; an increase in demand for different types of consumers (household, 
industry, agricultural); regulations imposed on water companies to reduce water abstraction, and; 
climate change. Similarly, for internal forces, these may include factors such as new available 
technologies and new enterprise goals by individual water companies. This illustration was produced 
as part of on-going research looking at a framework for architecting resilience in SoS at the early 
conceptual, design phases.    
The outcome of the architecture modelling process represents the architectural variants that have the 
potential to meet most, if not all, the new requirements of the SoS. Where no single architecture 
variant fully meets the requirement, there is the possibility that several of the candidate architectures 
could nearly meet the requirement but with different performance levels. However, at this stage 
factors such as cost, system performance, availability, resilience etc. have not been traded against 
each other to identify optimal solutions. Therefore, provision must be made to allow the strongest 
candidate architectures to be considered during analysis of the SoS and evaluated against the SoS and 
CS goals, to determine which solutions are most feasible and lie along the pareto front.   
 
 
Figure 4. Single Mains Supply to Demand Centres Figure 5. Dual Mains Supply to Demand Centres 
  
 
The role of the resilience viewpoint is also highlighted in Figure 6 where it is applied along-side other 
views in UPDM that allows the architect to fully describe the current state of the SoS. Furthermore, 
this also permits future state modelling of architectural variants that provide the desired additional 
capability. The resilience viewpoint is necessary at both stages, to assess current resilience of the SoS 
topology and to explore future resilience strategies through systems modeling. As with all modeling 
endeavours, the end goal is to simulate models to analyse their behavior and to validate the model 
against real data. The figure shows the process of creating the models and then submitting them to a 
co-simulation environment to assess the performance metrics which have been defined within the 
architecture. Although the role of the resilience viewpoint is static, it is a stepping-stone to the end 
goal of completely executable architectures. This article is primarily focused around the idea of this 
novel viewpoint and the benefits it will give to the architect in the case of engineering future states of 
SoS. It does not suggest the processes for translating static models into executable models in specific 
environments, although the emerging FMI standard (Blochwitz et al., 2009) is working towards 
achieving this.  
The Need for a Resilience Viewpoint 
 
An architecture framework is defined by ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 as, “conventions, principles and 
practices for the description of architectures established within a specific domain of application and/or 
community of stakeholders” (42010, 2016). Architecture frameworks assist architects or system 
developers in developing a model using some predefined guidelines. It provides a set of views that 
allow the systems architect to model a specific set of requirements by providing a systematic approach 
in understanding what aspects of a system would be relevant for a particular SoS, constituent system, 
or a stakeholder. Providing a certain set of perspectives called views that represent different aspects 
of a system the engineer can adopt and apply it in a manner that best fulfils its requirement. 
Architecture frameworks are useful because they provide: 
 
• A standard and systematic thought structure 
• A set of standard views and view descriptions 
• A standard data structure to retain and relate information 
• A standard approach to develop architectures (Urbaczewski & Mrdalj, 2006) 
Figure 6. SoS Architecture Modelling and Design Space Exploration Process 
  
 
 
Architecture frameworks were created to offer a guideline for developing architectures. The most 
commonly used frameworks are Zachmann and ToGAF, DoDAF, MoDAF (Hause, 2010a; Rouhani, 
Mahrin, Nikpay, Ahmad, & Nikfard, 2015; Urbaczewski & Mrdalj, 2006). Although these 
frameworks are commonly being used, each was developed for a purpose and is consequently specific 
to a particular domain. Each framework compromises a given set of views, however being domain 
specific these frameworks are most suitable to be used in the domain they were developed for. 
Architecture Frameworks have been characterized into four types based on the domains that they are 
used in: SoS, systems, enterprise and software architectures (Erol & Sauser, 2009). The first 
framework to support systems thinking was the Zachmann framework (Urbaczewski & Mrdalj, 
2006). The likes of DoDAF and MoDAF were developed for military purposes in the US Military 
and the UK military, respectively. 
 
Architecture frameworks support various methodologies to address the complexity of SoS. Although 
Architecture frameworks enable standardised modeling for any SoS, they have limited capabilities 
when it comes to lifecycle development of a SoS (Rouhani et al., 2015). Unfortunately, none of the 
architecture frameworks have simulation, verification and validation capabilities, which are 
undeniably essential to explore SoS and the resilience of SoS. As evolution is an important feature of 
a SoS, any SoS model needs to be able to allow architecture evolution. Furthermore, modeling human 
factors in SoS using these frameworks has always been argued and no particular architecture 
framework or any methodology describes a set method for incorporating human factors into 
modeling. The human aspect of SoS is crucial in the resilience and reliability of operational systems, 
and it is proposed to include a human element view within the resilience viewpoint. With changes in 
modeling methodologies and continuous evolution of SoS it has become essential that human factors 
be given more weight age while modelling SoS. The lacking capabilities of architecture frameworks 
can be summarised as follows: 
• Architecture frameworks do not indicate how to model humans or human behavior in a system.  
• Architecture frameworks do not have an extensive simulation capability. 
• Architecture frameworks do not permit the modeling of resilience aspects of systems/ SoS. 
• Architecture frameworks do not have optimization capability. 
• Architecture frameworks do not allow system verification and validation. 
The development of a “Resilience Viewpoint” within an Architectural Framework like DoDAF, 
MoDAF or the UPDM modelling language(Urbaczewski and Mrdalj, 2006;) has stemmed from 
extensive review and practical application of architecture frameworks in several industrial projects 
(DANSE, 2014). The benefits of exercising an architecture during systems engineering projects is 
highly detailed in literature that covers an assortment of domains and in different contexts; 
autonomous ground transport (Winokur, Dov, & Kemper, 2013); air transport systems (“Airbus,” 
2017; Winokur et al., 2013); military and defence; water supply (Winokur et al., 2013); enterprise 
organisations. Frameworks such as DoDAF and MoDAF support the following functions: 
 
• Modeling architectures for complex systems that include hardware, software, data, personnel 
and facility elements. 
• Modeling of systems of systems from high-levels of abstraction to the lower levels of detail. 
• Enhance the architecture information exchange among UML/SysML based tools. 
 
UPDM models can be combined with Constituent System (CS) models to create a joint time-based 
simulation of the SoS - This simulation allows evaluation of emergent behavior, discover any 
unpredicted emergent behaviors (potentially resilience), predict performance and find errors in the 
analysis. 
  
 
The Proposed Resilience Viewpoint 
The proposed viewpoint (Figure 7) will have views contained within, and will be an addition to 
existing architecture frameworks, such as DoDAF (Figure 8). The inclusive views will be applied to 
conduct analysis, such as static structural analysis (Filippini & Silva, 2014) of the resilience of a 
collection of systems. The semantics and the tools associated within the specific models will be 
suggested as those required to generate the models needed. For example, the tools will have 
‘connections’ such as “vulnerable” and “critical” to define the relationships between the CS and nodes 
of the network.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UPDM is a modeling language that consists of a set of viewpoints derived from both DODAF and 
MODAF. Details of what the different viewpoints offer from a modelling perspective can be found 
in (Hause, 2010a, 2010b; OMG, 2013), therefore we will not discuss these at length but introduce a 
summary description of the proposed Resilience Viewpoint; 
 
Resilience Viewpoint: The Resilience Viewpoint is a technical viewpoint that describes interactions 
amongst constituent systems and provides details of interaction types and particulars about 
vulnerability and criticality aspects of constituent elements. Additionally, the viewpoint is to be 
developed to include constraints and requirements from a resilience standpoint, showing the 
redundancy and common-mode failure aspects in designs.  
The initial view within the RV, RV-1 shows the high-level integration of constituent systems and 
their dependencies, communication and information channels and general operational relationships. 
This view will be similar to an operational view 1, OV-1 and systems view 1, SV-1 combined. The 
benefit of having a view which includes both sets of information, is that the detail can be fleshed out 
Figure 8. Resilience View Package to be Included with Existing Viewpoint Packages 
Figure 7. Resilience Viewpoint in DoDAF, MoDAF and UPDM 
  
 
in greater detail in a single instance, giving the architect more transparency of the operational aspects 
of the constituents. Furthermore, it allows for better understanding, operationally, illuminating areas 
of weakness within the SoS topology. This view precedes Resilience View 2, RV-2, a view analysing 
the structural resilience of the CS’s of interest. A generic example is provided for both RV-1 and RV-
2 in Figures 9 and 10, respectively. Figure 9 shows both the dependencies with a ‘Dependency’ 
connector and the information/data flows with a ‘Flow’ connector, connecting ports assigned to 
individual blocks/ CS.  
Resilience View 2, RV-2 allows the architect to depict the ‘criticality’ and ‘vulnerability’ within the 
topology. This is thought to be useful in applying a method that has been adopted from (Filippini & 
Silva, 2014) that shows the static resilience of critical infrastructure systems and SoS. This method 
can be applied to SoS from domains outside critical infrastructure, and by permitting such analysis 
within an architecture framework; it sanctions greater resilience understanding of the SoS for the 
architect who is attempting to design additional resilience features. By doing so, different 
architectural variations, i.e. different CS topologies, different structural components can be tested and 
evaluated within such a design space. As seen in figure 6, design space exploration must satisfy most, 
if not all, SoS goals, therefore architecture variants must not just make sense structurally; they must 
still deliver the dynamic attributes and performance metrics specified by the requirements. It is not 
always possible to meet every performance factor; it is essential to select the optimal candidate 
architectures to further analyse in perspective of the SoS requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Generic Resilience View 1 (RV-1) Model 
Figure 10. Generic Resilience View 2 (RV-2) Model (Annotated) 
  
 
Resilience Viewpoint Applied to Water Supply SoS 
The work described in this paper will now be exemplified through the water supply case study and 
demonstrated to better portray the application of the resilience viewpoint.  
The future availability of water in the UK is uncertain. Projections (UKP09) suggest that the change 
in climate and the rise in demand for water will increase pressure on current water resources. General 
trend projections indicate warmer and drier summers that will result in less water being available for 
all uses in the coming decades. Also, of concern are drier winters (draught), which results in the water 
resources (e.g. reservoirs and ground water sources) becoming depleted and not adequately 
replenishing before the spring and summer seasons, resultantly, putting substantial pressure on the 
water resources during summer months. It is suggested by the Environment Agency (EA) that some 
water resources in England and Wales are already under extreme pressure and are becoming 
unsustainable (Knight, Bishop, Grimshaw, Hughes, & Franks, 2016). This is an issue because there 
are no additional water resources to meet and fulfil the increasing demands of society, commerce and 
industry. To the end, the water needs of the UK population, industry and associated dependencies are 
expected to increase due to population growth (Knight et al., 2016), and thus, a resilient and robust 
water supply system is required for the forthcoming years and decades.  
Prior to exploring new water management strategies and solutions to meet the problems described in 
the water supply context, good systems engineering practice seeks to effectively engage stakeholders. 
Figure 11 outlines an initial stakeholder relationship map of the water supply system that shows the 
interdependencies within an OV-1 model in UPDM. Furthermore, to carry out “problem structuring 
methods” (Stillitto, 2015), a suggested method of causal loop modeling are employed to share, 
express and explain the problem to stakeholders. The importance of stakeholder engagement in any 
SoS project cannot be overstated. Engaging with stakeholders from different backgrounds and 
domains is crucial in understanding how they perceive the problem, or what their expectations are 
from a potential development or solution. Adapting a sound stakeholder strategy is an important facet 
to have early on, hence why creating an OV-1 (Figure 11) was strongly advised in the architecture 
Figure 11. UPDM Operational View 1 (OV-1) Model of Water Supply SoS 
  
 
development phase, so that the intricacies amongst stakeholders are understood, thus providing a 
good basis which the SoSE can teeth the nuances out of potentially biased stakeholder views. 
Stakeholder views will typically be centered at the CS-level and will likely be based on subjective 
experience that might not be completely relevant to the given problem or the new proposition. 
 There is therefore an evident requirement for resilient in the water supply system within the UK. 
This resilience would imply that water is successfully supplied to all demand regions (domestic, 
industrial and agricultural) whatever the circumstances are of the environment. The causal loop in 
Figure 12 shows the demand centres with respect to the rest of the water supply SoS. It can be seen 
from the figure, that the ever-increasing population puts pressure on providing water at a higher 
volume, this in itself requires thoughtful planning and alternative architectural solutions to meet this 
requirement. Additionally, the causal loop entails both the scenario of less water availability and 
increase temperatures, and also in crisis scenarios such as natural and made-made disasters. Natural 
disasters increase the probability of the water infrastructure being damaged and could jeopardize the 
supply of water (possibly clean drinking water) to customers. The concept of resilience, as discussed 
before, would attempt to mitigate against this risk and ensure the availability of water is present, even 
in times of severe circumstances, e.g. draught, floods, earthquakes and other scenarios.  
RV-1 in Figure 13 shows the dependency between three elements of the water supply SoS; the water 
treatment works; a clean water distribution network, and; water demand centres. The model allows 
the architect to model the operations of the CS and the dependencies and flows of information, data 
or resources between the elements as discussed previously. A subset of operations of the distribution 
network may include flow direction (displacement), flow rate (m3/s), capacity (m3/s), and pipe 
dimensions (m). Having created this top-level model, the RV-2 model can be applied to build the 
resilience picture and provide more insights into the problem space. 
Figure 12. Causal Loop Diagram of Water Supply SoS 
Figure 13. Example RV-1 Model of Water Supply SoS 
  
 
The next phase of the proposed modelling process is to identify the vulnerable elements of the 
network and those that are critically dependent on other elements. The RV-2 model in Figure 14 
highlights that the demand centres, as expected are critically dependent on the mains supply pipes to 
deliver fresh potable water to them and if the existing infrastructure (pipes) were to be damaged by 
some means, they become unstuck and without clean water. This may seem an obvious point to make, 
however by understanding the current system to great detail, fail-safe mechanisms can be 
implemented at the local level to alleviate against potential threats. This is clearly true for all types of 
systems, not only SoS. The important point to take from the RV-2 is that it has the capability to define 
‘critical’ relationships and also ‘vulnerable’ elements within the topology. A standalone demand 
centre, which may be a small rural community, may be vulnerable if they have only one source of 
water. A future design could be to connect that community’s water network to another demand centre 
and if required, to conduct water sharing between two demand centres. The infrastructure has a 
monetary cost; however, the level of resilience would have increased, especially for that individual 
demand centre.   
Significantly, the level of abstraction plays an important role in modeling systems such as the water 
supply SoS, and in the above example, lower levels of details can be modeled in separate instances 
of the proposed viewpoints. Detailed models may include specifics of the water supply infrastructure 
and incorporate pipe types, pumping stations, local reservoirs and so forth. Additionally, it is 
anticipated further resilience viewpoints will be developed to include non-functional aspects (ilities’) 
(Ricci, Fitzgerald, Ross, & Rhodes, 2014) which are believed to be an important approach to 
architecting resilient SoS. Such a viewpoint is currently under development and will allow the 
architect to highlight areas of where properties like flexibility, adaptability and changeability are 
lacking, and the possibility to design these properties into the architecture.  
Coincidentally, this viewpoint will seamlessly follow current architecture modeling methodologies 
and can be seen to flow coherently on from views from both the operational view package and the 
systems view package. Having defined the operational aspects of the system the concept of operations 
(CONOPS) using a series of operational views, the resilience aspects can be explored further, 
assigning functions to specific systems within the relevant views, within the systems view package. 
The architect can systematically and iteratively explore the resilience aspects of the systems of interest 
(SOI) by applying the proposed viewpoints. 
Conclusion 
This paper has proposed a novel architecture viewpoint to be developed within the existing 
architecture frameworks DoDAF, MoDAF and the Unified Profile of DoDAF and MoDAF (UPDM) 
modeling language, to tackle aspects of resilience - the Resilience Viewpoint. The viewpoint is an on-
Figure 14. Example RV-2 Model of Water Supply SoS 
  
 
going work-in-progress development, which forms part of a PhD research project aimed developing 
a framework for architecting resilience in systems of systems (SoS) at the early phases of design. The 
viewpoint is to be utilised by systems engineering practitioners and systems architects in both industry 
and academia with an interest in systems modeling and aspects of resilience engineering. This paper 
has proposed two views; Resilience View 1 (RV-1) and Resilience View 2 (RV-2), which offer 
semantics above and beyond those of currently existing views, namely, dependency and flow 
relationships, and vulnerability and criticality aspects between constituent systems, respectively. The 
research is focussed on further developing these two views, along with potentially introducing another 
view that offers the architect the capability to architect ilities (e.g. adaptability, , flexibility) into the 
SoS and its CS. Ultimately, this work will demonstrate how it will be possible to take an architecture, 
and demonstrate its performance qualities through some form of executable forms of the generated 
models within the resilience viewpoint and the architecture framework, as a whole.  
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